The effect of culture on home-ownership by Marcén, Miriam & Morales, Marina
 This article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but 
has not been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading 
process, which may lead to differences between this version and the Version of 
Record. Please cite this article as doi: 10.1111/jors.12433. 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
Miriam Marcén    ORCID iD: 0000-0002-1944-4790 
The effect of culture on home-ownership 
Miriam Marcén1 and Marina Morales1 
1Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain 
Corresponding Author: Miriam Marcén 
Universidad de Zaragoza 
Gran Vía 2 
50005 Zaragoza (Spain) 
mmarcen@unizar.es 
Telephone: +34876554684 
Marina Morales 
Universidad de Zaragoza 
Gran Vía 2 
50005 Zaragoza (Spain) 
mcmorales@unizar.es 
Telephone: +34876554620 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we analyze the role of culture in determining whether, or not, an 
individual is a homeowner. We use data on first-generation immigrants who 
arrived in the United States under six years old. Following the epidemiological 
approach, any dissimilarity in the proportion of homeowners by country of origin 
may be interpreted as a consequence of cultural differences. Our estimates indicate 
that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the cultural 
proxy and the immigrants’ choice of home-ownership. Additionally, we present 
evidence of different mechanisms of transmission of culture, which reinforces our 
results on the cultural effect. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Home-ownership has been found to have considerable socio-economic and 
demographic consequences, including impacts on household behavior, wealth, 
wages, mobility, labor-force participation, life satisfaction, physical and 
psychological health, and children’s outcomes, as well as on urban structure and 
segregation (Aaronson, 2000; Coulson & Fisher, 2009; Dietz & Haurin, 2003; 
Green & White, 1997; Goodman & Mayer 2018; Haurin, Parcel, & Haurin, 2002; 
Munch, Rosholm, & Svarer, 2008). Policy-makers have also traditionally 
considered home-ownership as an important public policy (Goodman & Mayer, 
2018). Nonetheless, at the country level, there is no clear pattern of convergence of 
home-ownership behavior (Fisher & Jaffee, 2003; Goodman & Mayer, 2018). 
Researchers have explored the possible determinants affecting the home-ownership 
decision, focusing on housing market conditions (Chiuri & Jappelli, 2003), 
mortgage markets (Badarinza, Campbell, & Ramadorai, 2016), tax regulations 
(Bourassa & Hoesli, 2010), employment and marital status (Feijten, 2005), political 
instability (Mudrazija & Butrica, 2017), income (Fisher & Jaffee, 2003), and 
demographic variables (Fisher & Jaffee, 2003; Goodman & Mayer, 2018), among 
others. Although all the factors mentioned here can influence home-ownership 
patterns, there can be other possible cross-country dissimilarities that may matter, 
as Goodman and Mayer (2018) indicate. In this paper, we consider the role of 
cultural differences in the home-ownership decision. 
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Culture is defined by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 2001) as “the set of distinctive spiritual, 
material, intellectual, and emotional features of society or a social group. Not only 
does this encompass art and literature, but it also includes lifestyles, ways of living 
together, value systems, traditions, and beliefs”. These beliefs and values cannot 
easily be measured and compared across countries, due to the interrelationships 
among institutions (such as capital and mortgage markets), economic conditions, 
and social norms/culture in each country (Fernández, 2007). For this reason, 
Fernández (2007) proposes an epidemiological approach to isolate the cultural 
effect from the institutional and economic conditions. Thus, the cultural effect is 
not used to describe differences in capital and mortgage markets (institutional 
environment). We concentrate on individual preferences and beliefs, broadly 
defined, as culture. In this setting, we examine the behavior of immigrants who 
arrived in the US at, or younger than, age five. Those immigrants have grown up 
under US markets, laws, institutions, and economic conditions, but their attitudes 
are probably similar to the preferences of their parents, forebears, and ethnic 
communities. Then, following the epidemiological approach, if the proportion of 
homeowners in the country of origin can explain the variations in home-ownership 
outcomes of first-generation immigrants, even after controlling for their individual 
characteristics, only the cultural component of this variable can be the determinant 
of this correlation (Fernández, 2007). 
Our work contributes to the growing research on the effect of culture on 
socio-economic and demographic outcomes (Fernández, 2011; Giuliano, 2016). 
Using methodologies analogous to ours, there is empirical evidence of the effect of 
culture on living arrangements (Giuliano, 2007), women’s labor-force participation 
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and fertility (Bellido, Marcén, & Molina, 2016; Contreras & Plaza, 2010; 
Fernández, 2007; Fernández and Fogli, 2006, 2009; Marcén, Molina, & Morales, 
2018), self-employment (Marcén, 2014), the search for a job (Eugster, Lalive, 
Steinhauer, & Zweimüller, 2016), the living-together decision (Marcén & Morales, 
2018), divorce (Furtado, Marcén, & Sevilla, 2013), and even on the math gender 
gap (Nollenberger, Rodríguez, & Sevilla, 2016). Related to our paper is the work of 
Rodríguez-Planas (2018), who finds a cultural impact on the probability of having 
a mortgage, using data on immigrants living in Spain in 2007, a boom year for 
immigration and access to buying a house. Her conclusions are only applicable to 
individuals who decide to get a mortgage and, as she indicates, she focuses on the 
existence of a cultural financial liability. In our case, we focus on the home-
ownership culture, although we also consider the possible cultural effect on both 
home-ownership and having a mortgage. 
In the literature, a few studies suggest the possible existence of a 
relationship between ethnicity and home-ownership, but they primarily compare 
immigrant and native behavior (Krivo, 1995). In general, studies show that 
immigrants are much less likely to own their own homes than are natives (Cahill & 
Franklin, 2013), pointing to the assimilation process in the host country as the main 
determinant of the home-ownership gap. For example, Constant, Roberts, and 
Zimmermann (2009) show that immigrants in Germany, classified in six different 
ethnicities, with a strong commitment to the host country, are more likely to 
achieve home-ownership. In the United States, Chinese immigrants are less likely 
to own their own homes than are the native population of Los Angeles, with 
Chinese ethnicity being an important factor in determining housing outcomes 
(Painter, Yang, & Yu, 2004). As Borjas (2002) explain, they also suggest that 
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
ethnic enclaves increase the probability of immigrants owning their own home. We 
add to this body of research by using home-ownership data as evidence that 
immigrants maintain similar home-ownership behavior to that of their counterparts 
in their respective countries of origin, suggesting that culture is important in the 
home-ownership decision. 
To run our main analysis, we use data from the 2016 American Community 
Survey (ACS) of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles, 
Genadek, Goeken, Grover, & Sobek, 2017). The cultural proxy is measured by 
utilizing data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International 
(IPUMS International), Minnesota Population Center (2017), which allows us to 
calculate the variable of interest more precisely, as in Marcén et al. (2018) and 
Marcén and Morales (2018). Results point to culture being an important factor in 
home-ownership. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the probability of immigrants in the US reporting being a homeowner, and 
the proportion of their counterparts who are homeowners in their respective 
countries of origin or ancestry. This is maintained after adding controls for 
observable and unobservable characteristics (including country of origin fixed 
effects), regardless of the definition of the cultural proxy, using different 
subsamples, and carrying out several robustness checks considering same- and 
different-origin couples. Note that the inclusion of the country of origin fixed 
effects is important in order to show additional evidence that our cultural proxy is 
not capturing other characteristics that could vary at the country of origin level. 
The last section presents evidence of the possible mechanisms of cultural 
transmission. Following Fernández and Fogli (2009) and Borjas (2002), we study 
whether culture is transmitted within communities. The possibility of vertical or 
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inter-generational transmission cannot be directly explored, since there is no 
available data on parents’ characteristics. However, we can study whether 
immigrants are sensitive to the concentration of elderly individuals of the same 
ethnicity, which can be considered as a channel for the intergenerational 
transmission of culture (Marcén & Morales, 2018). Similarly, we are able to study 
how culture operates horizontally by examining whether an increase in the 
concentration of old individuals of the same country of origin has an impact on the 
number of individuals who report being homeowners. Gender roles are also taken 
into account as potential determinants of how culture operates. All our findings 
reinforce the idea that culture is a significant factor in the home-ownership 
decision. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
data. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy. Our results are discussed in Section 
4, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. DATA 
We utilize data from the 2016 American Community Survey (ACS) of Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles et al. 2017) in our main analysis. 
Our sample consists of first-generation immigrants, aged 18 to 69 years old, who 
arrived in the United States when they were aged five or younger.1 We select those 
immigrants who are heads of household or householders, in order to include one 
observation per household.2 The sample is restricted to those individuals who live 
in identifiable metropolitan areas in the ACS data. In addition, we restrict our 
sample to those individuals reporting information about their country of origin and 
their home-ownership status. The main sample consists of 8,313 observations of 
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heads of household who are early-arrival immigrants living in MSAs and coming 
from 48 countries of origin.3 
Several studies using the epidemiological approach to identify the 
importance of culture on socio-economic and demographic variables concern 
second-generation immigrants, selected because they have been exposed to US 
markets and institutions their entire lives. In this setting, they are unlikely to suffer 
from language barriers and have not experienced the shock of immigration 
(Fernández, 2007; Fernández & Fogli, 2006, 2009; Giuliano, 2007). To determine 
whether an individual can be classified as second-generation, information on the 
birth place of the parents is needed, which is not always available. The ACS, for 
example, does not provide that information. Alternatively, Furtado et al. (2013) and 
Marcén et al. (2018) propose the use of young-arrival, first-generation immigrants 
since they can be considered quite similar to a sample of second-generation 
immigrants. Early-arrival immigrants, like second-generation immigrants, have 
been exposed to US conditions almost their entire lives and are not likely to have 
language barriers (Furtado et al., 2013). As Myers, Gao, and Emeka, (2009) 
explain, the impact of early arrival is important for English proficiency. 
With respect to the cultural proxy, we consider the home-country proportion 
of homeowners. Prior literature measuring home-ownership rates for a large sample 
of countries, such as Fisher and Jaffe (2003), usually consider data provided by 
international organizations or government websites. In our case, we calculate our 
cultural proxy using data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
International (IPUMS International). This dataset provides harmonized data 
obtained from 365 censuses in 94 countries (Minnesota Population Center, 2017). 
Because we are interested in home-ownership, we have also chosen those countries 
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with available information on whether a member of the household owns the 
housing unit. Unfortunately, we do not have information about home-ownership for 
all countries. 4  To calculate our cultural proxy, we select country-of-origin 
Censuses as close as possible to the year 2016 (see Table A2 in the Appendix), 
since our empirical strategy relies on the fact that the behavior of early-arrival, 
first-generation immigrants who respond to the 2016 ACS is similar to the behavior 
of their counterparts in their country of origin, in the same period of time.5 We 
have also maintained the same sample selection as that used for the early-arrival 
first generation immigrants; that is, a sample of heads of household aged 18 to 69. 6 
Then, the home country home-ownership rate is the proportion of heads of 
household who own their residence (total number of heads of household aged 18 to 
69 who are home-owners, in country of origin j, over the total number of heads of 
household aged 18 to 69 in country of origin j). 
That way of calculating the cultural proxy provides one measure of culture 
for each country. However, we have also extended this by utilizing several 
measures of culture for each country of origin, as in Marcén et al. (2018) and 
Marcén and Morales (2018). This is necessary, because the use of one measure of 
culture is based on the assumption that culture does not differ within each country, 
which may generate concerns about the validity of the results. It should be noted 
that the sample of first-generation immigrants may not exhibit a similar 
composition to that of the population in the country of origin. For example, 
immigrants can be younger, or more likely to be unmarried, than their counterparts 
living in the home country. To address this issue, we measure the cultural proxy 
more precisely to capture the preferences and beliefs of different groups of 
individuals with similar characteristics in each country of origin. Following the 
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proposal of Marcén et al. (2018), the cultural proxy is defined by country of origin, 
marital status, age, and employment status. This is defined in detail in the Results 
Section. 
Summary statistics are displayed in Table 1 for the main variables, 
classified from the lowest to the highest home-country proportion of homeowners. 
As can be seen, there are considerable differences in the number of individuals who 
are homeowners among countries of origin, from 33 percent in Switzerland to 96 
percent in Hungary. This is calculated using the IPUMS International. The average 
of homeowners is 70 percent, which is quite similar to that presented in Goodman 
and Mayer (2018) for the year 2015 (at 69.6 percent). As mentioned above, 
although many factors can determine those home-ownership dissimilarities, it is 
possible to argue that housing tenure outcomes cannot only be explained within a 
standard framework that accounts only for socio-economic, demographic, and 
housing market characteristics. For example, countries like Austria and Switzerland 
have sophisticated financial architectures, which can guarantee easy access to 
mortgages but they have low rates of home-ownership; in contrast, Vietnam, with 
high ownership rates has less well-developed credit markets. Thus, the existence of 
a home-ownership culture may also matter. We examine this with a sample of first-
generation immigrants. The rest of the columns in Table 1 describe our main 
sample of first-generation immigrants living in the US. Overall, 61 percent of the 
immigrants are homeowners, with those originating from Bolivia having the 
highest percentages (see column 2). By simply comparing the information obtained 
from the IPUMS International and that of the immigrants living in the US, in 
columns 1 and 2, a relationship between the behavior of the immigrants and that of 
their counterparts is not clearly observed. 
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It is also observed dissimilarities across immigrants in terms of gender 
composition, age, level of education, household composition, and marital status, by 
country of origin. Around 50 percent of immigrants are men, with this varying 
from just 32 percent in the case of immigrants from Iraq, to 67 percent in the case 
of those from Ethiopia. These first-generation immigrants are around 43 years old, 
on average, with the youngest being from Armenia, at 32 years old, and the oldest 
from Austria, at 61 years old. Regarding education, 27 percent of the immigrants 
have completed high school, with the lowest percentage being from Bangladesh 
and Malaysia, with no individual at this educational level, and the highest from 
Mexico (41 percent). With respect to those who have completed at least a college 
degree, the lowest percentages are observed among those originating from Mexico 
(45 percent), and the highest among those from Bangladesh and Malaysia (100 
percent). For household composition, 40 percent of immigrants have a child under 
the age of sixteen living in the household, with this ranging from a low of 8 percent 
for Austria and Hungary to a high of 56 percent for Malaysia. Our sample also 
presents dissimilarities in marital status: 27 percent of immigrants are singles or 
never married, with the lowest percentages for those from Jordan (5 percent), and 
the highest from Trinidad and Tobago (46 percent). All these differences in the 
composition of immigrants by country of origin are taken into account in our 
analysis by incorporating several variables to avoid the possibility that our results 
could be driven by these individual characteristics. 
The use of the 2016 American Community Survey (ACS) can generate 
concerns because of the proximity of the economic crisis, which may affect the 
home-ownership decisions of immigrants living in the US. To mitigate this 
concern, we show data on the proportion of homeowners, calculated for all 
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immigrants with information, from 2007 to 2016, and the same proportion for 
native US population (see Figure 1). Similar to what we find in the literature 
(Borjas, 2002; Coulson, 1999), home-ownership is, on average, lower for 
immigrants than for the native US population. That home-ownership gap is 
maintained during the economic crisis. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that the 
relationship between the proportion of immigrant homeowners in 2007 and the 
proportion of immigrant homeowners in 2016 in the U.S, by country of origin, is 
quite similar. Those who tend to choose to own a home in a low (high) proportion 
in 2007 also maintain a low (high) proportion in 2016. Thus, the behavior of 
immigrants by country of origin does not appear to change in the period under 
consideration.  
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
To determine the impact of culture on the home-ownership decision, we follow an 
epidemiological approach using data on early-arrival first-generation immigrants 
living in the US. Since these individuals grew up under the same US markets, laws, 
and institutions, if only the environmental factors are important in the home-
ownership decision, the home-country proportion of their counterparts owning a 
home, which is the proxy of the culture or social norms, should have no effect on 
the home-ownership decision of those immigrants. If culture does play a role, we 
would expect to find a relationship between the behavior of the immigrants living 
in the US and that of their counterparts in their countries of origin. We examine 
this issue by estimating the following equation:7 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐶𝑃𝐻𝑗 + 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒌𝜷𝟐 + 𝜹𝒌 + 𝜼𝒋 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 (1) 
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with 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘being a dummy variable that takes value one when immigrant i of cultural 
origin j living in Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) k reports owning a home, 
and zero otherwise. The cultural proxy, 𝐻𝐶𝑃𝐻𝑗, is the proportion of homeowners in 
the country of origin j. We revisit that measure of the cultural proxy below. In any 
case, if culture plays a role here, immigrants originating from countries whose 
counterparts tend to choose to own a home in a high proportion, should have a 
higher likelihood of being homeowners. In this setting, we would expect β1 to be 
positive. The vector Xijk includes individual characteristics, such as gender (being a 
man, or not), age and its square, education level (no high school graduate (omitted), 
high school graduate, some college, more college (more than four years of college), 
marital status (being single or never married, or not) and household composition 
(having children under sixteen living at home, or not).8 The inclusion of gender is 
necessary because we choose those first-generation immigrants who are heads of 
household and, as we have described above, there are variations in the proportion 
of men by country of origin. Since men have traditionally been the breadwinners, 
and thus have the economic capacity to buy a home, cross-country-of-origin 
differences in the proportion of homeowners could be simply explained by 
differences in the proportion of men in each immigrant group. Other researchers 
also indicate that the variations in the home-ownership decisions may be the result 
of dissimilarities in the age of the individuals and their level of education, for 
reasons independent of culture (Chiuri & Jappelli, 2003; Coulson, 1999). Thus, this 
should be taken into consideration in our regressions by controlling for those 
individual characteristics. With respect to the household composition, the literature 
documents that household composition is an important determinant in home-
ownership rates. As Constant et al. (2009) show, being married and having children 
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under the age of sixteen increases the probability of home-ownership. As before, 
the variations across countries of origin of these characteristics could be explaining 
the cross-country variations in the proportion of homeowners. To address this 
issue, we have incorporated dummies to control for whether the head of household 
is single or never married, and whether there is any child below the age of sixteen 
in the household. In addition, we control for unobservable variables across the US 
by introducing MSA fixed effects, denoted by 𝛿𝑘  and for the country of origin 
unobserved characteristics, by introducing country of origin fixed effects, 𝜼𝒋.
9 
The empirical strategy described above allows us only to analyze the impact 
of culture on the home-ownership decision. We have also extended our work using 
alternative methodologies to explore the choice of owning a home living with a 
partner of the same ethnicity, or not, and to the analysis of home-ownership and 
taking on a mortgage. This is explained in detail in Section 4. 
An alternative strategy to study the cultural effect would be the inclusion of 
dummy variables for the various countries of origin, rather than controlling directly 
for the home-ownership rate in these countries, as in Giuliano (2007). The benefit 
of this approach is that it does not require a linear relationship as our model 
establishes between the cultural proxy and the dependent variable. However, this 
technique does not allow for a clear specification of how culture matters (Furtado 
et al., 2013). First, because of the large number of countries of origin (48), which 
makes it difficult to interpret the coefficients in terms of culture. Second, country 
of origin dummies not only capture the differences in the home-ownership across 
countries, but also other unobservable characteristics that vary at the country level. 
Then, the interpretation of those coefficients would be tricky, because it is not clear 
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that we would be capturing the home-ownership culture by only using country of 
origin dummies. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1.Baseline model 
Table 2 reports the estimates of Equation 1, with the cultural proxy defined as the 
home-country proportion of homeowners (HCPH). Our results appear to be 
consistent with the prior literature. Being male and having children under the age 
of sixteen increases the probability of home-ownership (Constant et al., 2009). As 
Goodman and Mayer (2018) show, the older the individuals, the more likely they 
are to be homeowners. The impact of age has an inverted U-shape, achieving the 
maximum at 83 years old. Note that our immigrants are all below the age of 83. 
The estimates for the education level controls are also consistent with the existing 
empirical results, since higher levels of education are related to greater 
probabilities of home-ownership (Coulson, 1999; Constant et al., 2009; Goodman 
and Mayer, 2018). Being single or never married decreases the probability of 
owning one’s own dwelling. This result is also in line with the literature suggesting 
that married individuals are more likely to be homeowners (Feijten, 2005; Constant 
et al., 2009). 
The estimated coefficient on the cultural proxy (HCPH) indicates that a 
higher proportion of homeowners in an immigrant’s country of origin is associated 
with an increase in the probability that that immigrant reports owning his/her home 
(see column 1). We observe that, when the cultural proxy (HCPH) increases by 1 
percentage point, there is a rise of around 0.23 percentage points in the probability 
that an immigrant reports being a homeowner in the US. The cultural proxy in 
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column 1 is measured as the home-country proportion of homeowners, by 
including only one measure of culture for each home country, which is the usual 
strategy in the research on the cultural effect. However, the use of just one cultural 
proxy by home country does not take into account the heterogeneity within 
countries of origin, which is a common problem in much of the literature on the 
cultural effect. For example, the preferences and attitudes regarding home-
ownership can differ within each home country, depending on marital status. In 
some countries, individuals who decide to buy a home when they are singles can be 
stigmatized, whereas, in other countries, being a homeowner while single may be 
socially accepted. If this heterogeneity is transmitted to the preferences and beliefs 
of our sample of immigrants, the inclusion of additional controls does not take into 
consideration the cultural variations within each home country. As in Marcén et al. 
(2018), we can use alternative cultural proxies, measuring the culture more 
precisely by country of origin and marital status, with the marital status being 
classified as: married/unmarried couple, single or never married, separated or 
divorced, and widow. 10  Thus, we are capable of incorporating four different 
measures of the home-ownership culture for each home country.  
Social norms (or culture) can also vary across age groups within each 
country of origin. Owning a home may be more socially acceptable for older 
individuals than for young individuals. The possible cultural differences across 
marital status and age group can easily be observed by plotting the relationship 
between the proportion of homeowner immigrants in the US, and the proportion of 
their counterparts owning a home by country of origin, marital status, and age 
group, in Figures 3 and 4. We have included those individuals who are aged 31 to 
56, and two marital-status groups (married/unmarried couples and singles or never 
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married) as an example. In both cases, we observe the expected positive 
relationship between the two variables: the larger the home-country proportion of 
homeowners, the greater the proportion of immigrants who decide to own a home 
in the US. Nonetheless, while, for example, in Ireland and Pakistan, individuals 
tend to choose to buy a home in a similar proportion when they are 
married/unmarried couples, we observe considerable differences between those two 
countries for the category single or never married individuals: 43 percent of single 
individuals in Ireland choose to buy a home on average, while 74 percent of single 
individuals in Pakistan decide to be homeowners. As before, to tackle this issue, 
were define our cultural proxy as the proportion of homeowners by country of 
origin, marital status, and age group, considering four age intervals: 18 to 30, 31 to 
43, 44 to 56, and 57 to 69. In this case, we incorporate in our estimations 16 
different measures of culture for each home country. The differences across age 
groups and employment status by home country may also generate concerns about 
how and for whom the home-ownership culture may play a role. Again, to address 
this issue, we repeat the same analysis with our cultural proxy calculated by 
country of origin, marital status, age group, and employment status (employed, 
unemployed, and not in the labor force). In this context, there are 48 different 
measures of culture for each home country. 
Results are shown in Table 2, where the home-country cultural proxy is 
added by marital status in column 2, by marital status and age group in column 3, 
and by marital status, age group, and employment status in column 4.11 The use of 
these definitions of the cultural proxy, with more than one measure of culture by 
country of origin, permits us to add country of origin fixed effects to capture the 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries. This is important because, without 
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those fixed effects, the estimated coefficient of the cultural proxy could be picking 
up the effect of culture in addition to, or instead of, the impact of other 
unobservable characteristics that vary at the home country level, and that may also 
affect home-ownership decisions. In all cases (columns 2 to 4), we find a positive 
relationship between the home-country proportion of homeowners (regardless of 
the categories included in the cultural proxy) and the probability that an immigrant 
owns a home in the US. All these specifications include Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSAs) fixed effects and country of origin fixed effects.12 These estimates 
provide empirical evidence pointing to the fact that we are capturing the impact of 
culture on the home-ownership decision. The magnitude of the effect is 
considerably larger in column 2 than in the rest of the columns. In that 
specification, our cultural proxy has been calculated by marital status and country 
of origin, and our results point to an increase of 0.55 percentage points in the 
probability of being a homeowner in the US, when the cultural proxy (HCPH) 
increases by 1 percentage point. Therefore, comparing countries of origin, 
immigrants from countries where their counterparts tend to choose to buy a home 
in a high proportion (for example, Hungary), are about 34.5 percentage points more 
likely to be homeowners in the US because of the impact of culture, than 
immigrants from countries with a low HCPH (for example, Switzerland). It is 
worth noting that after redefining our main explanatory variable by groups, it can 
be surmised that we are over-controlling for age and marital status. To mitigate this 
concern, we repeat the analysis by excluding controls for age and marital status in 
column 5. Our findings do not change.13 For the rest of the analysis, we consider 
the home-country cultural proxy by marital status in most of the specifications. 
Results are unchanged when we use the other measures of culture. In any case, 
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Goodman and Mayer (2018) explain that the age-pattern of home-ownership in the 
United States is similar to that of other countries: the older the individuals, the 
more likely they are to be homeowners. Thus, cultural differences could be more 
important by marital status across countries of origin.14 
Since, in the literature, female heads of household have been found to be 
less likely to own a home than married non-head-of-household women (Haurin & 
Kamara, 1992), our results may be driven by gender differences. This can be more 
problematic, since we only consider, at this point of the analysis, the information 
on head of household though, as we have described above, we use a gender-
balanced sample, on average. We revisit this issue below. In any case, we separate 
the sample by gender to explore the existence of possible gender issues in our 
estimations. Results are displayed in columns 6 and 7 for men and women, 
respectively. In both cases, we find that the home-country proportion of 
homeowners is positively related to the probability of home-ownership for 
immigrants (men and women, separately). Thus, our results do not appear to 
depend on gender differences. 
Although all our sample of US early-arrival immigrants have grown up in 
the same country, the US, it can be argued that US markets, laws, and institutions 
are not equal in all states. Then, since immigrant groups are likely to cluster within 
particular parts of the US, it is possible to surmise that we are capturing differences 
in US states, in addition to (or instead of) the cultural effect of the country of 
origin. As mentioned above, we have run our analysis adding MSA fixed effects, 
which should pick up those differences - in our case, at a lower level than the state 
level. To examine this further, we check the consistency of our results by adding 
the proportion of homeowners by US state, in column 8 of Table 2. This variable is 
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supposed to capture differences in home-ownership behavior across the US. Our 
findings do not change: neither the sign nor the magnitude of the coefficient of the 
cultural proxy. 
We also report simple robustness checks by repeating the analysis without 
the two countries with the highest and the lowest home-country proportion of 
homeowners (Hungary and Switzerland), to check whether this affects our 
estimates. Results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. Our estimates do 
not change. We conclude the same in observing column 3, where we eliminate 
those immigrants from Mexico, which is the country with the largest number of 
observations. We also repeat the analysis utilizing a subsample of immigrants aged 
30 to 50 years old, to reduce concerns about heterogeneity across age groups.15 
Estimated coefficients are shown in column 4 of Table 3. We find that the impact 
of our cultural proxy remains statistically significant and the magnitude of the 
effect is slightly greater than that previously obtained. 
Until now, we have obtained the cultural proxy using information on the 
country of origin for the year 2016, or the closest available. This relies on the 
notion that the behavior of immigrants living in the US in 2016 is similar to their 
counterparts living in their home country in that year. Nevertheless, since culture is 
transmitted from parents to their children when they are young (Furtado et al., 
2013), it can be argued that the preferences and beliefs of immigrants are quite 
similar to those of their parents when they arrived in the US, so to calculate the 
cultural proxy we should consider information on home-ownership in the countries 
of origin some decades earlier. Our immigrants are 43 years old on average in 
2016, so information on home-ownership in the 1970s can represent the culture that 
their parents transmitted.16 Results do not change, (see column 5 of Table 3), which 
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is not surprising since culture changes slowly, as Fernández (2007) asserts.17 It is 
also possible to argue that our results depend on the ACS data used in our analysis. 
We only consider the 2016 ACS in the main analysis. Although the behavior of the 
immigrants does not appear to change substantially over time, as observed in 
Figures 1 and 2, this is not conclusive. To provide further empirical evidence in 
favor of our findings, we extend our sample to include information from the 2014, 
2015, and 2016 ACS. This gives us a larger sample of immigrants. Results are 
unchanged (see column 6 of Table 3). Then, the possible changes on the 
composition of the immigrant sample do not appear to lead to different findings. 
The choice of heads of household characteristics in the main analysis is also 
a possible problem for the validity of our estimations, as mentioned above. We can 
easily check whether our conclusions vary after the incorporation of heads of 
household and their immigrant partners, if any, in our sample. Estimated points are 
reported in column 7 for the entire sample, in column 8 for men, and in column 9 
for women. The positive relationship between the cultural proxy and the 
probability of being a homeowner is observed. It is reassuring that, regardless of 
the measure of the cultural proxy, and even after dividing the sample by gender, the 
effect of culture is still present. 
As prior research suggests, economic or political changes that occurred in 
some countries are responsible for different waves of migration to the US 
(Villarreal, 2014), which can affect our estimates. To address this issue, we control 
for the timing of migration by adding dummies for the year of migration, in column 
1 of Table 4. Our results remain similar to those previously described, suggesting 
that the differences in the year of migration do not have an impact on our 
regressions. Moreover, we analyze whether immigrants’ sensitivities to their home-
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country culture differ, depending on their time of migration, by including 
interaction terms between our cultural proxy and the period of migration fixed 
effects. Because of the large number of interactions that this generates, we had to 
redefine the time of migration fixed effects using dummies for the decade in which 
the immigrants arrived in the US.18 Results are shown in columns 2 and 3 (with a 
sample of individuals older than 30). Regardless of the decade of migration, the 
estimated cultural effect is always positive, although for the case of those arriving 
in the 1990s and 2000s, it is not statistically significant (and the magnitude of the 
coefficient is lower). This may be due to the fact that younger cohorts were more 
affected by the crisis than older ones. As Myers, Lee, and Simmons, (2019) 
explain, younger individuals have delayed home buying because of the Great 
Recession. We choose a sample of early-arrival first-generation immigrants who 
arrived in the US at or below the age of five, so that all those arriving in the 1990s 
and 2000s are the youngest individuals in our sample. We have repeated the 
analysis with a sample of individuals older than 30, who are supposed to be less 
affected in their home-ownership decision by the last recession, and our findings 
clearly point to the cultural effect (see column 3). Similarly, we can also examine 
this issue by including interaction terms between our cultural proxy and the age of 
individuals in our sample. As before, we redefine the age of individual fixed effects 
using dummies by age interval (18-29 (omitted), 30-39, 40-49, 50-59 and 60-69 
years old). Results show that, for the youngest individuals (18-29), the cultural 
effect is the lowest and it is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
Again, a possible explanation is that the ownership decision of young individuals 
could be more affected by the recent Great Recession by, for instance, the 
postponement of buying a home (Myers et al. 2019), than by the cultural effect. It 
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can also be surmised that, since the negative impact that immigrant status has on 
the probability of home-ownership decreases over time (Coulson, 1999), those 
young immigrants needs more time to behave as their counterparts in their country 
of origin.19 
For additional empirical evidence that our results are not affected by 
heterogeneity across countries, the analysis has been repeated incorporating 
controls for observable characteristics of the countries of origin, in Table 5. We 
include the unemployment rate, GDP per capita (in constant 2010 $US), the female 
labor-force participation rate, a property prices index, and a property rights 
index. 20 As prior research suggests, the probability of owning a home can be 
influenced by those factors that impact housing availability and affordability 
(Clark, Deurloo, & Dieleman, 1997; Rodríguez-Planas, 2018). The exclusion of 
those variables can be problematic if those observable characteristics vary at the 
country level, and are correlated with our variable of interest, the cultural proxy. In 
this setting, it could be that our cultural proxy is picking up the effect of those 
determinants on the home-ownership decision. Table 5 presents the estimations 
incorporating all the measures of the cultural proxy considered in Table 2 (columns 
1 to 4), as well as separating the sample by gender (columns 5 and 6).21We find, 
again, a positive association between the cultural proxy and the probability of being 
a homeowner. In short, all the estimations described in this section indicate that 
culture can affect the home-ownership decision. 
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4.2.First mortgage, second mortgage, and the home-ownership 
decision: The cultural effect 
Recently, Rodríguez-Planas (2018) has suggested that there is a financial culture on 
the decision to have mortgage financing. She follows the epidemiological approach 
and finds that mortgage financing in the home country is a factor in the 
immigrants’ mortgage decision in the host country. This can be related to our 
framework, since to be able to buy a house, in most cases, people need mortgage 
financing. In her paper, the possible existence of social norms regarding home-
ownership is not considered. With respect to home-ownership issues, she only adds 
the property rights index at the country of ancestry level. Although we do not focus 
on the possible impact of culture on mortgage financing, it could be that we are 
capturing the social norms affecting mortgage financing, in addition to, or instead 
of, those regarding home-ownership. This is also a possible problem in the work of 
Rodríguez-Planas (2018), since she could be confounding both culture regarding 
home-ownership and social norms regarding mortgage financing in her estimates. It 
can be argued that home-ownership is only attractive for those with positive 
attitudes regarding mortgage financing and so they are the only ones who can 
afford the payment for their own home. The opposite can also be surmised, that is, 
it is possible that only those immigrants originating from countries of origin where 
home-ownership is socially acceptable are the immigrants who consider mortgage 
financing more acceptable. The separation of both social norms is tricky. 
Unfortunately, we only have information on whether our sample of heads of 
household own their own dwelling but are encumbered by a mortgage, in the 2016 
ACS. There is no information about the immigrants who have paid off their 
mortgages in 2016 or some years before. 
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In this setting, we can only check whether our conclusions vary when we 
separate the sample between those reporting owning a house with a mortgage and 
those that do not report having that debt. Results are shown in column 1 (excluding 
those individuals without a mortgage and with the dependent variable taking the 
value of one when an immigrant reports being a homeowner with a mortgage and 
zero otherwise), and column 2 (excluding those individuals with a mortgage and 
with the dependent variable taking the value of one when an immigrant reports 
being a homeowner and zero otherwise) of Table 6. In both cases, regardless of the 
definition of the dependent variable and the subsample considered, we observe a 
positive relationship between the cultural proxy and the probability of being a 
homeowner in the US, pointing to the importance of culture as a factor in 
determining home-ownership.  
The ACS also provides information on whether owner-occupied housing 
units with a first mortgage were encumbered by a second mortgage or home equity 
loan. To provide additional estimates in favor of the cultural effect, we have 
extended the analysis, including first and second mortgages. We propose the use of 
a model for nominal outcomes, specifically a Multinominal Logit Model (MNL) in 
which we calculate a separate binary logit for each pair of outcome categories 
(Nervole and Press, 1973). Formally, we estimate the following equation: 
ln𝜑𝑚|𝑏 = ln Pr (𝑦=𝑚|𝐱)Pr (𝑦=𝑏|𝐱) = 𝐱′𝜷𝒎|𝒃 for m=1 to J (2) 
with b being the base category and m varying from one to J. J is the total number of 
outcome categories, in our case, four (not being a homeowner, being a homeowner 
without mortgage, owning a house encumbered by only a first mortgage, owning a 
house encumbered by a second mortgage). The vector x also includes the controls 
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that we have defined above. Results are presented in columns 3 to 5 of Table 6.22 
In order to study the dynamics among the outcome categories, we use odds ratios, 
(Greene, 2008; Long and Freese, 2014). Holding other variables constant, the 
changed factor in the odds of outcome category m versus outcome category n, 
when 𝑥𝑖  increased by 𝛿, equals: 
𝜑𝑚|𝑛(𝒙,𝑥𝑖+𝛿)
𝜑𝑚|𝑛(𝒙,𝑥𝑖) = 𝑒𝛃𝐢,𝐦|𝐧𝛿 (3) 
For a unit change in 𝑥𝑖 , 𝛿 = 1, the odds of m versus n are expected to 
change by a factor of exp (𝛽𝑖,𝑚|𝑛) , holding all other variables constant. For a 
standard deviation change in 𝑥𝑖, 𝛿 = 𝑠𝑥𝑖 , the odds of m versus n are expected to 
change by a factor of exp (𝛽𝑖,𝑚|𝑛 × 𝑠𝑥𝑖). The odds ratios have been plotted in an 
odds-ratio plot in Figure 5 to be easily interpreted (Long & Freese, 2014). Our 
variable of interest, the cultural proxy, and the rest of the controls are represented 
in separate rows. The horizontal axis measures the relative magnitude of the 
coefficients associated with each outcome category. The numbers correspond to the 
outcome categories: "one" denotes not being a homeowner, which is the base 
category in that figure, "two" is a homeowner without a mortgage, "three" owning 
a house encumbered by only a first mortgage, and "four" being a homeowner with 
a first mortgage, but also encumbered by a second mortgage. The distance between 
a given pair of outcome categories indicates the magnitude of the effect, and the 
statistical significance is shown by drawing a line between categories for which 
there is no statistically significant coefficient at the 10 percent level of significance. 
Results suggest that the greater the proportion of homeowners in the country of 
ancestry of our sample of immigrants, the less likely is the category one (not being 
a homeowner). Then, the choice would be the categories two or three, but between 
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them there are no statistically significant differences. This is not surprising, since 
we do not know whether those homeowners without mortgage (category two) 
afforded a house with a mortgage but they have already paid off that mortgage in 
2016, when the information for this survey was collected. In any case, both 
categories are to the right of the category not being a homeowner, suggesting that 
the cultural proxy matters in the home-ownership decision. What is not so 
predictable is that the higher the cultural proxy, the more willing are immigrants to 
take on debt - not only by way of a first mortgage, but also with a second mortgage. 
Thus, the more acceptable is home-ownership in an immigrant’s home country, the 
more likely is that the immigrant takes on debt in order to buy a house in the host 
country. Being aware of the weaknesses of the information on mortgage finance, it 
is comforting that all these estimates suggest that culture is a factor in the home-
ownership decision. 
4.3.The effect of culture on home-ownership: Same origin partner or 
not 
Previously, we have performed the analysis using the characteristics of the country 
of ancestry of our householder first-generation immigrants, where the decision to 
own a house is attributed to the characteristics, preferences, and beliefs of only one 
of the members of the household (the householder). Nevertheless, in those cases in 
which the householder has a married or unmarried partner, the characteristics of the 
other member of the couple may also be a factor in the home-ownership decision of 
the couple. There are two alternatives, having a partner of the same ethnicity, or 
having a partner of a different ethnicity.23 We first explore whether the cultural 
effect is detected in the case of married or unmarried couples having a partner of 
the same ethnicity. Table 7 includes the estimated points. Column 1, which 
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includes only a sample of couples with a partner of the same ethnicity, reveals 
similar results to those described above. The greater the proportion of married and 
unmarried couples who report being homeowners in the country of ancestry, the 
greater the probability of being homeowners in the US for a couple from that 
country of ancestry. 
In the case of couples of different origin or ethnicity, it can be supposed that 
the preferences of the heads of household’s partners are driving our findings.24 In 
column 2 of Table 7, we incorporate as a measure of culture the HCPH of the head 
of household’s partner (HH’s partner). Although there is a positive relationship, 
which is not surprising since both the HCPH of the heads of household and that of 
their partners is positively related, the coefficient capturing this new measure of the 
cultural proxy is only significant at the 10 percent level. An explanation for this 
finding could be that we are adding to that regression the country of origin of the 
heads of household fixed effects, and this can be highly correlated with the home 
country cultural proxy of the heads of household’s partner. The same is observed in 
column 3, where we have dropped the country of origin fixed effects because they 
cannot be used in this specification (since we have included the cultural proxy of 
the head of household defined with only one measure of culture for each home 
country).25 In column 3, only the cultural proxy of the head of household’s partner 
is statistically significant, but not that of the head of household. As mentioned 
above, this could be due to the fact that both are highly correlated. Alternatively, 
we include the mean between both cultural proxies of the head of household and 
his/her partner as a proxy of the home-ownership culture in that house. This 
measure of culture is included in column 4. As can be seen, there is a positive 
effect of the variable of interest on the probability of owning a home in the US, but 
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again only at the 10 percent significance level. In columns 2 to 4, the sample used 
only includes couples with different ethnicities. We also check whether the 
redefinition of the cultural proxy as the mean HCPH of both members of the couple 
affects our initial sample. First, we consider the entire sample but excluding those 
immigrants with a partner for whom the Census provided by the IPUMS 
International has no information (see column 5). Then, with the sample of column 
5, we maintain the same cultural proxy with the exception of that of different-
origin couples, in which the mean HCPH of both members of the couple is utilized 
in column 6. The magnitude of the effect does not vary so much. The main sample 
is incorporated in the last column, column 7, where the redefinition of the cultural 
proxy for those couples of different origin, having information on the cultural 
proxy for both members of the couple, does not alter our findings. 
4.4.The mechanisms through which culture operates 
From the previous analysis, it is possible to infer that culture affects the home-
ownership decision. This subsection explores the possible channels of transmission 
of culture. Furtado et al. (2013), Marcén et al. (2018), and Marcén and Morales 
(2018) explain that the vertical transmission of culture cannot be examined because 
we do not have information on parents’ characteristics in some of the US Census 
and ACS data. However, home-ownership culture can also be transmitted 
horizontally, through neighbors, friends, or the ethnic communities in which 
immigrants live. Following the existing literature, we study the horizontal 
transmission of culture, analyzing whether immigrants’ sensitivities to the home-
country proportion of homeowners vary depending on whether they live in 
predominantly same-ethnicity communities. Fernández and Fogli (2009) also point 
to this mechanism of cultural transmission since local/ethnic communities maintain 
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culture either by providing role models for acceptable behavior, or by punishing 
deviance from the social norm/culture. In this setting, we consider the possible 
existence of network effects in order to identify that horizontal transmission of 
culture, as Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) do, with the following 
model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝑃𝐻𝑗 + 𝑿𝑖𝑗𝑘𝜷𝟑 + 𝜹𝒌 + 𝜼𝒋 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 (4) 
where 𝑃𝑗𝑘 is the proportion of immigrants from the same country of origin j in each 
metropolitan area k. The remaining variables have been defined above. Our 
variable of interest is the interaction between ethnic concentration and the home-
country proportion of homeowners. If there is a horizontal transmission of culture, 
we would expect that an increase in the concentration of same-ethnicity immigrants 
will increase the probability of home-ownership, more for immigrants originating 
from countries with a high proportion of homeowners than for those from countries 
with a low proportion of homeowners. Then, 𝛽2 should be positive. 
Table 8 shows the estimations of Equation 4. In the first column, ethnic 
concentration appears to have no effect on the probability of being a homeowner. 
The same occurs after adding the cultural proxy in column 2. The concentration 
coefficient is not statistically significant, but the home-country cultural proxy has 
the expected positive sign and the magnitude is the same value as in our baseline 
specification, in column 2 of Table 2. The interaction between the ethnic 
concentration and the HCPH is added in column 3, as in Furtado et al. (2013). In 
that case, the coefficient capturing the effect of the ethnic concentration is negative 
and statistically significant, and the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that, depending on the HCPH level, the effect of the ethnic 
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concentration varies from positive to negative. This result may be interpreted as 
follows: an increase of 10 percentage points in the concentration of immigrants 
from Switzerland leads to a decrease of 0.11 in the probability of home-ownership 
for those immigrants in the US (the proportion of homeowners in Switzerland is 
0.33). The same increase in the concentration of immigrants from Hungary results 
in an increase of 0.08 in the probability of home-ownership for Hungarians (the 
proportion of homeowners in Hungary is 0.96). An increase in the concentration of 
individuals of the same ethnic community appears to lead to a decrease in the 
probability of owning a home for individuals originating from countries where their 
counterparts tend to be homeowners in a low proportion, while an increase in the 
probability of owning a home is observed for those originating from countries with 
a high proportion of homeowners. 
Prior studies point to the growth of ethnic enclaves in major American 
cities as an important factor in increasing immigrant demand for owner-occupied 
housing in many metropolitan areas. However, as before, such studies do not 
examine the different patterns by establishing a relationship between home-
ownership behavior and those in the country of origin. Borjas (2002) suggests that 
ethnic enclaves increase the probability that immigrant households own their 
homes, although our results reveal that this is only true at certain levels of HCPH. 
Of course, we recognize that this is not a full-proof method of identifying the 
horizontal transmission of culture but, it is reassuring that our estimations suggest 
that immigrants are sensitive to their ethnic communities, providing additional 
empirical evidence that social norms/culture may play a role. 
Another channel through which culture may operate is the respect for 
elders, as Marcén and Morales (2018) suggest. Since many societies are 
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distinguished by the importance of respect for the elderly and the maintenance of 
family bonds (Jambunathan, Burts, & Pierce, 2000; Wakil, Siddique, & Wakil, 
1981), it is possible that an individual decides to be a homeowner in obedience to, 
or respect for, the traditions of the elderly members of their communities. Being 
conscious of the scarcity of data on this issue, we can only follow the same strategy 
as before, examining whether immigrants’ sensitivities to the cultural proxy change 
depending on whether they live in predominantly older same-ethnicity 
communities. As can be seen in column 4, the coefficient picking up the effect of 
the proportion of the elderly of the same origin is negative and statistically 
significant, whereas that of the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant. This indicates that the impact of the concentration of same-ethnicity 
elders varies from negative to positive, depending on the level of the cultural 
proxy, which may in turn suggest that culture is operating through respect for the 
older members of the community. 
The gender roles may lead to different levels of home-ownership culture 
assimilation. To tackle this issue, we follow the proposal of Gay, Hicks, Santacreu-
Vasut, and Shoham (2017) and Marcén and Morales (2018), by controlling whether 
a language employs a grammatical gender system, based on biology, or not; 
individuals speaking a language with a gender-based system are more likely to 
follow traditional norms. Information is compiled by linguists in the World Atlas of 
Language Structures Online (Dryer & Haspelmath, 2013).26 Assuming that more 
traditional norms imply a higher proportion of individuals owning their own homes 
by those individuals originating from more traditional cultures (considering the 
gender-based language systems), we see a greater impact of the home country 
cultural proxy. When the cultural proxy (HCPH) increases by 1 percentage point in 
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countries of origin with gender-based language systems (countries not using 
gender-based language systems), there is a rise of around 0.555 (0.420) percentage 
points in the probability that an immigrant reports owning a house in the US (see 
column 5 of Table 8). The results described in this section provide evidence of 
some of the channels (ethnic enclaves, respect for the elderly, and gender roles) 
through which culture may be transmitted and may operate, providing 
supplementary empirical evidence in favor of the existence of a cultural effect in 
the home-ownership decision. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Cross-country differences in the proportions of home-ownership have not varied 
considerably in recent decades (Goodman & Mayer, 2018). The literature points to 
several factors as possible determinants of those dissimilarities, such as housing 
market conditions, mortgage markets, tax regulations, and demographic conditions, 
among others. However, even these institutional and economic factors cannot fully 
explain cross-country variation. For example, the access to sophisticated financial 
architectures, such as that of Austria or Switzerland, does not assure high home-
ownership rates. In contrast, there can be observed quite high home-ownership 
rates in less well-developed credit markets, such as that of Vietnam. Thus, 
following Goodman and Mayer (2018), who suggest that culture may also play a 
role here, we examine the possible cultural effect on home-ownership. To pick up 
the effects of culture apart from those of markets, laws, and institutions (such as 
capital and mortgage markets) in determining the home-ownership decision, we 
follow an epidemiological approach (Fernández, 2007), using data on immigrants 
arriving in the US when very young, from the 2016 ACS. Since all of these 
individuals grew up under the same US laws, markets, and institutions, we can 
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interpret any positive relationship between the home-country proportion of 
homeowners and the decision to own a home in the US, as evidence that culture 
matters in the decision. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior research on this issue. In the 
literature, researchers point to ethnicity as an important factor in explaining the 
home-ownership gap between natives and immigrants, showing that more 
integrated immigrants in the host country are more likely to achieve home-
ownership (Constant et al., 2009). Then, they focus on the comparison between 
natives and immigrants. Our paper builds on prior work, analyzing the home-
ownership differences within immigrant populations. We study the relationship 
between immigrants’ home-ownership behavior and that of their counterparts in 
their respective countries of origin, in order to explore the cultural effect. 
We find evidence of a positive and statistically significant effect of the 
cultural proxy on the likelihood that an immigrant owns a home. The impact of 
culture is greater when the cultural proxy is measured more precisely within each 
country of origin, calculating the cultural proxy by marital status, age, and 
employment status, in order to take into account the heterogeneity within countries 
of ancestry as in Marcén et al. (2018) and Marcén and Morales (2018). Results are 
robust to controls for observable and unobservable characteristics by country of 
ancestry, and to the use of different subsamples. It is worth noting that we have 
detected a low impact of culture on the youngest individuals. A possible 
explanation of this result is that their ownership decision could be driven by recent 
Great Recession (Myers et al. 2019), diminishing the cultural effect. 
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The possible existence of a mortgage-finance culture has also been 
considered in our analysis. Using the epidemiological approach, Rodríguez-Planas 
(2018) has explored mortgage-finance culture using Spanish data. This is related to 
our work, although it is not clear whether it is the home-ownership culture or the 
mortgage culture that matters, or whether both are important in the home-
ownership decision. We present several scenarios of owning a home: without a 
mortgage, with only a first mortgage, and with a second mortgage. The cultural 
proxy is always positively related to those three possibilities, which again points to 
the possible existence of a cultural effect. Recognizing the scarcity of mortgage-
finance data, what is remarkable from our analysis is that the more acceptable is 
home-ownership in an immigrant country of origin, the greater the probability that 
the immigrant will take on debt in order to afford a house in the host country.  
The exploration of alternative kinds of household, such as same- or 
different-origins, provides additional empirical evidence of the cultural effect. With 
a sample of same-origin couples, our conclusions do not vary, and the cultural 
proxy is positively related to the probability of owning a home. For different-origin 
couples, we have checked several samples and definitions of the cultural proxy in 
order to include the culture of the head of household’s partner. Again, all our 
results point to the possibility that culture can be a determinant in the home-
ownership decision. 
Finally, the transmission of culture has also been explored in this work. 
With the available data, we can only study the horizontal transmission (ethnic 
communities) of culture but not the vertical transmission (from parents to their 
offspring). Other researchers have also analyzed the possible effect of ethnic 
enclaves on home-ownership, without considering the cultural issue as we do here 
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(following Furtado et al., 2013). Our analysis is interesting since we observe that 
the effect of ethnic concentration varies from positive to negative depending on the 
HCPH level. Specifically, we find that, for high levels of HCPH, immigrants are 
sensitive to the behavior of their ethnic communities, increasing the probability of 
being homeowners. However, for low levels of HCPH, the concentration of same-
ethnicity individuals discourages immigrants from choosing to own a home. 
Additionally, we examine other possible ways through which culture may operate, 
such as respect for the elders and gender roles. In both cases, we find evidence that 
there can be transmission of culture through those channels. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: The effect of culture on the home-ownership decision using 
Probit Models 
Notes: The home-country proportion of homeowners is calculated using information from the 
IPUMS International. The sample, obtained from the 2016 ACS, consists of immigrants aged 
18 to 69 who arrived in the US at or before the age of 5 and who report a country of origin. In 
the first column, the home-country cultural proxy has been calculated by country of origin. In 
columns 2 to 4, that variable has been measured by marital status, marital status and age group, 
and marital status, age group and employment status, respectively. Estimates are weighted. 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country of origin, are in parentheses. *** Significant at 
the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level 
 
Dependent variable: Homeowner (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HCPH 0.652* 
   
 
(0.374) 
   
HCPH by marital status 
 
1.277*** 
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(0.221) 
  
HCPH by marital status and age  
  
1.064*** 
 
group (18-30, 31-43, 44-56, 57-69) 
  
(0.196) 
 
HCPH by marital status, age and  
   
0.991*** 
employment status 
   
(0.177) 
Man 0.137*** 0.122*** 0.120*** 0.112** 
 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.049) 
Age 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) 
Age2/100 -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.010 -0.010 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) 
High school graduate 0.089 0.080 0.094* 0.099* 
 
(0.055) (0.051) (0.054) (0.055) 
Some college 0.269*** 0.258*** 0.261*** 0.284*** 
 
(0.062) (0.071) (0.071) (0.065) 
More college 0.536*** 0.507*** 0.509*** 0.514*** 
 
(0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.042) 
Children under sixteen 0.240*** 0.202*** 0.221*** 0.216*** 
 
(0.054) (0.057) (0.055) (0.058) 
Single or never married -0.513*** -0.320*** -0.412*** -0.437*** 
 
(0.038) (0.060) (0.047) (0.041) 
Observations 8,313 8,313 8,313 8,104 
Table A2: Home-Country Censuses from IPUMS 
International 
Notes: This table shows the Censuses of the countries of origin utilized to 
calculate the cultural proxies. 
 
Country 2016 Census Year (IPUMS International) 
1970 Census Year 
(IPUMS International) 
Argentina 2001 1970 
Armenia 2011 2001 
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Austria 2001 1981 
Bangladesh 2011 1991 
Bolivia 2001 1976 
Brazil 2010 1970 
Canada 2011 1981 
Chile 2002 1970 
Colombia 2005 1973 
Costa Rica 2011 1973 
Dominican Republic 2010 1981 
Ecuador 2010 1974 
El Salvador 2007 1992 
Ethiopia 2007 1984 
Fiji 2007 1986 
France 2011 1968 
Greece 2011 1971 
Haiti 2003 1971 
Hungary 2011 1970 
India 1987 1987 
Indonesia 2010 1971 
Iran 2006 2006 
Iraq 1997 1997 
Ireland 2011 1981 
Italy 2001 2001 
Jamaica 2001 2001 
Jordan 2004 2004 
Kenya 2009 1989 
Malaysia 2000 1970 
Mexico 2015 1970 
Morocco 2004 1982 
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Nicaragua 2005 1971 
Nigeria 2010 2006 
Pakistan 1998 1998 
Panama 2010 1980 
Peru 2007 1993 
Philippines 1990 1990 
Poland 2002 1978 
Portugal 2011 1981 
Romania 2011 1977 
Spain 2001 1991 
Switzerland 2000 1970 
Thailand 2000 1970 
Trinidad and Tobago 2011 1970 
Turkey 2000 1985 
United Kingdom 2001 1991 
Venezuela 2001 1971 
Vietnam 2009 1999 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the proportion of homeowner natives and the 
proportion of homeowner immigrants from 2007 to 2016. 
Notes: Data come from the IPUMS USA 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between the proportion of homeowners in 2007 and the 
proportion of homeowners in 2016, by country of origin. 
Notes: Data come from the IPUMS USA 
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Figure 3: The proportion of homeowner immigrants in the US, and the 
proportion of homeowners in their respective countries of origin. All married 
or unmarried and aged 31 to 56. 
Notes: The home-country proportion of homeowners, calculated using data from the IPUMS 
International, is plotted on the x-axis, while the proportion of homeowner immigrants of those 
countries of origin, calculated using data from the 2016 ACS, is plotted on the y-axis. In both cases, 
married individuals aged 31 to 56 are considered. 
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Figure 4: The proportion of homeowner immigrants in the US, and the 
proportion of homeowners in their respective countries of origin. All single 
and aged 31 to 56. 
Notes: The home-country proportion of homeowners, calculated using data from the IPUMS 
International, is plotted on the x-axis, while the proportion of homeowner immigrants of those 
countries of origin, calculated using data from the 2016 ACS, is plotted on the y-axis. In both cases, 
single individuals aged 31 to 56 are considered. 
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Figure 5: No homeowner (outcome one), homeowner without mortgage 
(outcome two), owning a house encumbered by only a first mortgage (outcome 
three), being a homeowner with a first mortgage but also encumbered by a 
second mortgage (outcome four): using a Multinomial Logit. 
Notes: Robust standard errors. The numbers correspond to the outcome categories: one indicates not 
being a homeowner, two indicates being a homeowner without mortgage, three indicates owning a 
house encumbered by only a first mortgage, and four being a homeowner with a first mortgage but 
also encumbered by a second mortgage. The statistical significance is shown by drawing a line 
between categories for which there is no significant coefficient at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics by country of origin 
 
Country 
Home
-
countr
y 
cultur
al 
proxy 
Proportio
n of 
homeown
er 
immigrant
s 
Ma
n Age 
High 
school 
graduat
e 
Some 
colleg
e 
More 
colleg
e 
Childre
n under 
sixteen 
Single 
or 
never 
marrie
d 
Observatio
ns 
Switzerland 0.33 0.68 0.61 
43.5
2 0.06 0.06 0.87 0.32 0.23 31 
Austria 0.50 0.79 0.47 
61.1
0 0.27 0.24 0.42 0.08 0.15 62 
Jamaica 0.53 0.56 0.43 
41.0
4 0.21 0.21 0.57 0.37 0.41 104 
Dominican 
Republic 0.54 0.37 
0.4
3 
38.6
3 0.21 0.36 0.33 0.54 0.35 150 
Colombia 0.54 0.51 0.46 
41.6
6 0.22 0.22 0.53 0.34 0.31 140 
France 0.54 0.77 0.55 
53.7
7 0.27 0.21 0.51 0.14 0.16 238 
Poland 0.58 0.67 0.56 
44.3
7 0.21 0.15 0.62 0.36 0.27 84 
Ecuador 0.62 0.49 0.53 
43.6
1 0.19 0.34 0.45 0.30 0.27 74 
Nigeria 0.62 0.58 0.58 
37.3
5 0.06 0.06 0.81 0.26 0.42 31 
Ireland 0.64 0.72 0.48 
51.6
2 0.08 0.36 0.56 0.18 0.22 50 
Bolivia 0.65 0.81 0.44 
41.0
0 0.13 0.31 0.56 0.50 0.25 16 
Malaysia 0.65 0.63 0.63 38.5 0.00 0.19 0.81 0.56 0.31 16 
Mexico 0.66 0.54 0.47 
39.5
9 0.41 0.28 0.17 0.52 0.28 2,760 
Jordan 0.66 0.79 0.63 
48.0
5 0.32 0.26 0.42 0.32 0.05 19 
Kenya 0.66 0.71 0.50 
44.2
1 0.14 0.21 0.64 0.29 0.21 14 
Turkey 0.67 0.67 0.48 
47.1
9 0.12 0.39 0.49 0.34 0.21 67 
Canada 0.68 0.73 0.55 
49.0
4 0.20 0.22 0.57 0.24 0.23 725 
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Iran 0.68 0.71 0.62 
39.9
5 0.11 0.21 0.68 0.51 0.24 76 
Iraq 0.68 0.59 0.32 
41.9
1 0.32 0.18 0.50 0.36 0.36 22 
Morocco 0.68 0.62 0.41 
51.2
2 0.27 0.24 0.41 0.16 0.32 37 
Costa Rica 0.69 0.48 0.56 
42.6
0 0.12 0.36 0.52 0.36 0.28 25 
United Kingdom 0.69 0.70 0.53 
48.2
5 0.22 0.24 0.52 0.25 0.24 721 
Peru 0.70 0.53 0.53 
42.4
3 0.14 0.26 0.55 0.34 0.31 58 
Greece 0.70 0.68 0.47 
49.2
5 0.27 0.21 0.52 0.31 0.22 77 
Italy 0.70 0.79 0.54 
51.9
7 0.29 0.23 0.44 0.24 0.17 333 
Chile 0.71 0.77 0.49 
44.4
1 0.15 0.13 0.69 0.33 0.28 39 
Brazil 0.72 0.62 0.53 
44.4
6 0.24 0.21 0.51 0.38 0.29 76 
Portugal 0.72 0.75 0.53 
47.7
8 0.32 0.25 0.29 0.34 0.18 96 
Haiti 0.73 0.52 0.40 
40.9
8 0.14 0.26 0.59 0.36 0.40 58 
Argentina 0.73 0.66 0.52 
46.8
4 0.15 0.26 0.56 0.34 0.25 61 
Fiji 0.73 0.45 0.55 
38.1
8 0.36 0.36 0.27 0.55 0.18 11 
El Salvador 0.74 0.50 0.52 
37.9
6 0.36 0.27 0.29 0.48 0.39 162 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.77 0.48 
0.4
3 
41.3
5 0.22 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.46 46 
Venezuela 0.77 0.57 0.56 
43.2
2 0.13 0.19 0.65 0.22 0.28 54 
Indonesia 0.77 0.67 0.52 
41.7
4 0.07 0.22 0.67 0.48 0.22 27 
Panama 0.79 0.69 0.55 
50.2
7 0.25 0.22 0.51 0.25 0.16 134 
Pakistan 0.80 0.65 0.56 
35.6
0 0.05 0.25 0.69 0.49 0.31 55 
Spain 0.81 0.76 0.53 
45.8
8 0.23 0.21 0.56 0.32 0.19 104 
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Philippines 0.81 0.55 0.52 
41.3
8 0.14 0.32 0.53 0.43 0.29 498 
Ethiopia 0.81 0.57 0.67 
43.7
1 0.10 0.19 0.67 0.29 0.29 21 
Thailand 0.82 0.59 0.50 
36.5
1 0.22 0.30 0.45 0.55 0.40 152 
India 0.82 0.57 0.58 
36.9
8 0.07 0.13 0.78 0.37 0.35 242 
Bangladesh 0.82 0.59 0.45 
32.7
7 0.00 0.32 0.68 0.32 0.41 22 
Nicaragua 0.85 0.53 0.44 
36.9
4 0.18 0.36 0.39 0.45 0.30 66 
Armenia 0.89 0.39 0.54 
31.8
9 0.14 0.29 0.57 0.46 0.29 28 
Romania 0.92 0.59 0.49 
37.0
3 0.15 0.28 0.54 0.38 0.38 39 
Vietnam 0.92 0.73 0.54 
39.4
5 0.11 0.21 0.67 0.52 0.34 368 
Hungary 0.96 0.58 0.63 
50.5
4 0.17 0.25 0.50 0.08 0.21 24 
Mean 0.70 0.61 0.50 
43.0
8 0.27 0.26 0.41 0.40 0.27   
Std. Dev. 0.09 0.49 0.50 
12.6
0 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.45   
Note: Data comes from the 2016 American Community Survey (ACS) of 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Sample (IPUMS). The sample contains 8,313 
observations of immigrants, aged 18 to 69, originating from 48 different countries. 
Table 2: The effect of culture on the home-ownership decision 
 
Dependent variable: 
Homeowner (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(8) 
HCPH 
0.230*
*             
 
 
(0.110) 
      
 
HCPH by marital status 
 
0.548*
** 
   
0.577*
** 
0.536*
** 
0.548*
** 
  
(0.063) 
   
(0.091) (0.098) 
(0.063
) 
HCPH by marital status 
  
0.493*
 
1.167*
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and age  ** ** 
group (18-30, 31-43, 44-
56, 57-69) 
  
(0.059) 
 
(0.046
) 
  
 
HCPH by marital status, 
age and  
   
0.440*
** 
   
 
employment status 
   
(0.056) 
   
 
Proportion of 
homeowners by state        
0.767*
** 
        
(0.160
) 
Man 
0.044*
** 
0.037*
* 
0.036*
* 0.032* 0.027* 
  
0.037*
* 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
(0.015
) 
  
(0.015
) 
Age 
0.030*
** 
0.031*
** 
0.017*
** 
0.017*
** 
 
0.033*
** 
0.028*
** 
0.031*
** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
(0.003
) 
Age2/100 
-
0.018*
** 
-
0.020*
** 
-
0.008*
* 
-
0.008*
* 
 
-
0.022*
** 
-
0.016*
** 
-
0.019*
** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.005) (0.004) 
(0.004
) 
High school graduate 
0.043*
** 
0.043*
** 
0.049*
** 
0.052*
** 
0.048*
** 0.023 
0.051*
* 
0.043*
** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
(0.016
) (0.023) (0.019) 
(0.015
) 
Some college 
0.113*
** 
0.126*
** 
0.129*
** 
0.140*
** 
0.124*
** 
0.115*
** 
0.118*
** 
0.125*
** 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.023) 
(0.029
) (0.042) (0.026) 
(0.028
) 
More college 
0.196*
** 
0.193*
** 
0.198*
** 
0.203*
** 
0.187*
** 
0.154*
** 
0.216*
** 
0.193*
** 
 
(0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) 
(0.031
) (0.036) (0.028) 
(0.027
) 
Children under sixteen 
0.081*
** 
0.059*
** 
0.067*
** 
0.067*
** 0.034* 
0.069*
** 
0.054*
* 
0.058*
** 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) 
(0.018
) (0.014) (0.024) 
(0.017
) 
Single or never married - - - -
 
- - -
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0.170*
** 
0.081*
** 
0.116*
** 
0.129*
** 
0.067*
** 
0.083*
** 
0.081*
** 
 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
(0.023) (0.022) 
(0.015
) 
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country of origin fixed 
effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,313 8,313 8,313 8,104 8,313 4,198 4,115 8,313 
R2 0.273 0.294 0.295 0.298 0.264 0.317 0.333 0.296 
Notes: The home-country proportion of homeowners is calculated using information from the 
IPUMS International. The sample, obtained from the 2016 ACS, consists of immigrants aged 18 to 
69 who arrived in the US at or before the age of 5 and who report their country of origin. In the first 
column, the home-country cultural proxy has been calculated by country of origin. In columns 2 to 
4, that variable has been measured by marital status, marital status and age group, and marital status, 
age group and employment status, respectively. In column 5, controls for age and marital status 
have been excluded. Column 6 only incorporates immigrants who are men, and column 7 only 
incorporates immigrants who are women. Column 8 adds the proportion of homeowners in each US 
state using data from the IPUMS. Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by 
country of origin, are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 
percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table 3: Simple robustness checks 
Dependent variable: 
Homeowner (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
HCPH by marital status 0.543*** 
0.550
*** 
0.563
*** 
0.703
***  
0.583
*** 
0.498
*** 
0.484
*** 
0.551
*** 
 
(0.063
) 
(0.063
) 
(0.079
) 
(0.108
)  
(0.035
) 
(0.064
) 
(0.096
) 
(0.095
) 
HCPH (Census 1970) 
    
0.646
*** 
    
     
(0.116
) 
    Man 0.037** 
0.037
** 0.021 
0.041
** 
0.035
** 
0.026
*** 0.011 
  
 
(0.015
) 
(0.015
) 
(0.016
) 
(0.019
) 
(0.013
) 
(0.008
) 
(0.009
) 
  Age 0.031*** 
0.031
*** 
0.031
*** 0.026 
0.031
*** 
0.036
*** 
0.036
*** 
0.038
*** 
0.035
*** 
 
(0.003
) 
(0.003
) 
(0.005
) 
(0.030
) 
(0.003
) 
(0.002
) 
(0.002
) 
(0.003
) 
(0.003
) 
Age2/100 -0.020
-
0.020
-
0.020 -0.012 
-
0.020
-
0.026
-
0.025
-
0.027
-
0.023
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*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
(0.004
) 
(0.004
) 
(0.006
) 
(0.038
) 
(0.004
) 
(0.002
) 
(0.003
) 
(0.004
) 
(0.003
) 
High school graduate 0.043*** 
0.043
*** 0.030 -0.004 
0.041
*** 
0.094
*** 
0.088
*** 
0.091
*** 
0.078
*** 
 
(0.016
) 
(0.016
) 
(0.059
) 
(0.018
) 
(0.015
) 
(0.008
) 
(0.012
) 
(0.021
) 
(0.016
) 
Some college 0.126*** 
0.125
*** 0.078 
0.089
* 
0.123
*** 
0.154
*** 
0.148
*** 
0.167
*** 
0.123
*** 
 
(0.028
) 
(0.028
) 
(0.061
) 
(0.045
) 
(0.028
) 
(0.011
) 
(0.018
) 
(0.024
) 
(0.024
) 
More college 0.193*** 
0.194
*** 
0.149
** 
0.191
*** 
0.190
*** 
0.255
*** 
0.227
*** 
0.221
*** 
0.224
*** 
 
(0.027
) 
(0.027
) 
(0.058
) 
(0.030
) 
(0.027
) 
(0.016
) 
(0.019
) 
(0.024
) 
(0.025
) 
Children under sixteen 0.059*** 
0.059
*** 
0.082
*** 
0.066
** 
0.055
*** 
0.017
* 
0.060
** 
0.049
** 
0.073
** 
 
(0.017
) 
(0.017
) 
(0.018
) 
(0.029
) 
(0.019
) 
(0.009
) 
(0.024
) 
(0.019
) 
(0.029
) 
Single or never married 
-
0.082
*** 
-
0.081
*** 
-
0.075
*** 
-
0.057
*** 
-
0.097
*** 
-
0.083
*** 
-
0.116
*** 
-
0.109
*** 
-
0.120
*** 
 
(0.015
) 
(0.015
) 
(0.023
) 
(0.017
) 
(0.013
) 
(0.010
) 
(0.013
) 
(0.021
) 
(0.017
) 
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country of origin fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,282 8,289 5,553 4,456 8,313 25,257 
13,45
8 6,307 7,151 
R2 0.293 0.294 0.309 0.240 0.298 0.261 0.291 0.309 0.316 
 
Note: The home-country proportion of homeowners is defined by marital status in all columns except in column 5. 
Our cultural proxy is calculated for International Censuses of 1970 in column 6. In column 7, 2014 and 2015 ACS 
are included in addition to 2016 ACS. Columns 7 to 9 incorporate both head and non-heads of household. 
Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by country of origin, are in parentheses. *** Significant 
at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level 
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Table 4: The effect of culture on the home-ownership decision by 
year of migration and age  
Dependent variable: Homeowner (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HCPH by marital status 0.571*** 0.989*** 
0.983**
* 0.133* 
 
(0.066) (0.307) (0.323) (0.073) 
1950s x HCPH by marital status 
 
-0.456 -0.427 
 
  
(0.378) (0.394) 
 
1960s x HCPH by marital status 
 
-0.282 -0.241 
 
  
(0.350) (0.367) 
 
1970s x HCPH by marital status 
 
-0.353 -0.278 
 
  
(0.339) (0.350) 
 
1980s x HCPH by marital status 
 
-0.285 -0.217 
 
  
(0.299) (0.313) 
 
1990s x HCPH by marital status 
 
-
0.885*** 0.709  
  
(0.328) (0.447) 
 
2000s x HCPH by marital status 
 
-0.815* 
  
  
(0.427) 
  
30-39 years x HCPH by marital status 
   
0.561**
* 
    
(0.107) 
40-49 years x HCPH by marital status 
   
0.570**
* 
    
(0.115) 
50-59 years x HCPH by marital status 
   
0.450**
* 
    
(0.119) 
60-69 years x HCPH by marital status 
   
0.551**
* 
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(0.162) 
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country of origin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of immigration fixed effect Yes No No No 
P-value (F-test of HCPH + 1950 x HCPH) 0.003 0.004 
 
P-value (F-test of HCPH + 1960 x HCPH) 0.000 0.000 
 
P-value (F-test of HCPH + 1970 x HCPH) 0.000 0.000 
 
P-value (F-test of HCPH + 1980 x HCPH) 0.000 0.000 
 
P-value (F-test of HCPH + 1990 x HCPH) 0.207 0.000 
 
P-value (F-test of HCPH + 2000 x HCPH) 0.558 
  
P-value (F-test of HCPH + 30-40 years x HCPH 
  
0.000 
P-value (F-test of HCPH + 40-50 years x HCPH 
  
0.000 
P-value (F-test of HCPH + 50-60 years x HCPH 
  
0.000 
P-value (F-test of HCPH + 60-69 years x HCPH 
  
0.000 
Observations 8,313 8,313 6,731 8,313 
R2 0.302 0.299 0.233 0.299 
 
Note: The home-country proportion of homeowners is defined by marital status in 
columns 1 to 4. We have included all the controls for the individual characteristics 
defined in Equation 1. Column 3 only includes individuals older than 30 years old. 
Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by country of origin, are 
in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent 
level, * Significant at the 10 percent level.  
Table 5: More robustness checks, adding home-country observable 
characteristics 
Dependent variable: 
Homeowner (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HCPH 0.262** 
     
 
(0.100) 
     HCPH by marital status 
 
0.468*** 
  
0.484*** 0.470*** 
  
(0.062) 
  
(0.075) (0.092) 
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HCPH by marital status and age  
  
0.421*** 
   group (18-30, 31-43, 44-56, 57-
69) 
  
(0.051) 
   HCPH by marital status, age and  
   
0.380*** 
  employment status 
   
(0.047) 
  Man 0.040** 0.034** 0.033** 0.029 
  
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
  Age 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Age2/100 
-
0.021*** 
-
0.023*** 
-
0.013*** 
-
0.012*** 
-
0.026*** 
-
0.019*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
High school graduate 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.056*** 0.026 0.066*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.017) 
Some college 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.113*** 0.125*** 0.091* 0.116*** 
 
(0.030) (0.033) (0.032) (0.027) (0.054) (0.021) 
More college 0.194*** 0.187*** 0.190*** 0.196*** 0.134*** 0.230*** 
 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.040) (0.019) 
Children under sixteen 0.073*** 0.056*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.070*** 0.043** 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.020) 
Single or never married 
-
0.171*** 
-
0.095*** 
-
0.126*** 
-
0.137*** 
-
0.081*** 
-
0.102*** 
 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.022) 
Property Prices Index 0.001 0.0005 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.001 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Property Rights Index -0.0005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP pc 0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Unemployment rate -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
Female labor force participation -0.002 -0.003* -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,885 7,885 7,885 7,677 3,987 3,898 
R2 0.282 0.290 0.290 0.294 0.307 0.325 
 
Note: In column 1, the home-country cultural proxy has been calculated by country of origin. In 
columns 2 to 4, that variable has been measured by marital status, marital status and age group, and 
marital status, age group and employment status, respectively. Column 5 only incorporates 
immigrants who are men, and column 6 only incorporates immigrants who are women. Estimates 
are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by country of origin, are in parentheses. *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
Table 6: Home-ownership and mortgage finance culture 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   Multinomial Logit Model: 
Dependent variable: 
Homeowner 
with 
mortgage 
Homeowner 
without 
mortgage 
Homeowner 
without 
mortgage 
Homeowner 
with a first 
mortgage 
Homeowner 
with a 
second 
mortgage 
      HCPH by marital status 0.633*** 0.378*** 1.791*** 2.155*** 3.390*** 
 
(0.077) (0.066) (0.373) (0.374) (0.750) 
Man 0.038** 0.022* 0.158** 0.228*** 0.119 
 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.077) (0.072) (0.131) 
Age 0.033*** -0.009*** -0.011 0.165*** 0.438*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.029) (0.016) (0.051) 
Age2/100 -0.023*** 0.026*** 0.099*** -0.123*** -0.358*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.030) (0.019) (0.050) 
High school graduate 0.056*** 0.007 -0.152 0.201** 0.702*** 
 
(0.019) (0.015) (0.141) (0.094) (0.259) 
Some college 0.151*** 0.049*** -0.073 0.537*** 1.302*** 
 
(0.032) (0.012) (0.131) (0.141) (0.318) 
More college 0.231*** 0.090*** 0.294*** 0.947*** 2.024*** 
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(0.032) (0.016) (0.105) (0.099) (0.323) 
Children under sixteen 0.066*** 0.038*** 0.269*** 0.345*** 0.431** 
 
(0.019) (0.011) (0.101) (0.098) (0.174) 
Single or never married -0.071*** -0.033** -0.422*** -0.563*** -0.453** 
 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.088) (0.122) (0.183) 
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes No No No 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes No No No 
Observations 7,071 4,451 8,313 8,313 8,313 
R2 0.296 0.311       
 
Note: The home-country proportion of homeowners has been defined by marital status. In column 1, 
those homeowners without mortgage have been excluded from our sample. In column 2. those 
homeowners with mortgage have been excluded from our sample. In columns 3 to 5, we study the 
effect of culture on home-ownership using a Multinomial Logit Model. Estimates are weighted. 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country of origin, are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 
percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table 7: Same- or different-origin couples (Heads of Household (HH) 
and their partners). 
Dependent 
variable: 
Homeowner 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) 
Sample 
Same 
origin 
couples 
Different 
origin 
couples 
Different 
origin 
couples 
Different 
origin 
couples 
 
All (excluding immigrants 
without their partner’s 
HCPH) 
All 
 All 
HCPH of the HH 
for married and  0.740*** 
 
0.105 
 
 
  
 
 
Unmarried couples (0.152) 
 
(0.148) 
 
     
HCPH of the HH’s 
partner 
 
0.444* 0.598** 
 
 
  
 
 
  
(0.251) (0.236) 
 
 
  
 
 Mean between the 
HCPH of the HH 
   
0.888* 
 
  
 
 and the HCPH of 
the HH’s partner  
   
(0.503) 
 
  
 
 HCPH by marital 
status     
 
0.564***  
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      (0.064)    
HCPH by marital 
status and the 
mean      
 
 0.576*** 
 0.55
8**
* 
HCPH of the 
different origin 
couples     
 
 (0.066) 
 
(0.0
65) 
Man 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.016 
 
0.036** 0.035** 
 0.03
6** 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
(0.015) (0.015) 
 (0.0
15) 
Age 0.028*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 
 
0.031*** 0.031*** 
 0.03
1**
* 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 (0.0
03) 
Age2/100 -0.012* -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.037*** 
 
-0.019*** -0.019*** 
 -
0.02
0**
* 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
 (0.0
04) 
High school 
graduate -0.004 0.021 0.027 0.021 
 
0.041** 0.038** 
 0.04
0** 
 
(0.021) (0.047) (0.044) (0.047) 
 
(0.016) (0.016) 
 (0.0
15) 
Some college 0.095*** 0.061 0.058 0.061 
 
0.120*** 0.117*** 
 0.12
2**
* 
 
(0.016) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) 
 
(0.029) (0.028) 
 (0.0
28) 
More college 0.154*** 0.153*** 0.161*** 0.153*** 
 
0.186*** 0.181*** 
 0.18
9**
* 
 
(0.025) (0.055) (0.050) (0.055) 
 
(0.029) (0.028) 
 (0.0
27) 
Children under 
sixteen 0.027 0.058*** 0.064*** 0.058*** 
 
0.053*** 0.053*** 
 0.05
8**
* 
 
(0.027) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
(0.017) (0.017) 
 (0.0
17) 
Single or never 
married 
-
0.175*** -0.189*** -0.186*** -0.189*** 
 
-0.080*** -0.075*** 
 -
0.07
8**
* 
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(0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
 
(0.015) (0.015) 
 (0.0
16) 
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Country of origin 
of the HH fixed 
effects No Yes No Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 1,466 3,319 3,319 3,319 
 
8,039 8,039 
 8,31
3 
R2 0.363 0.342 0.326 0.342 
 
0.296 0.297 
 0.29
5 
 
Note: The home-country proportion of homeowners has been defined by marital status. 
Column 1 only includes those individuals with a same-ethnicity partner. Columns 2, 3 and 
4 only include those individuals with different-origin partner. Those individuals with a 
different-origin partner for whom there is no information in IPUMS International have 
been excluded from our sample in columns 5 and 6. Estimates are weighted. Robust 
standard errors, clustered by country of origin, are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 
percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level 
Table 8: Channels of transmission of culture 
Dependent variable: Homeowner (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Proportion of individuals of the same origin by 
MSA -0.189 -0.192 
-
2.015*** 
 
 
 
(0.202) (0.196) (0.262) 
 
 
HCPH by marital status 
 
0.548*** 
 
 
0.420** 
  
(0.063) 
 
 
(0.171) 
Proportion of individuals of the same origin by 
MSA  
  
2.882*** 
 
 
X HCPH by marital status 
  
(0.293) 
 
 
Proportion of immigrant elders of  
   
-
1.571*** 
 
the same origin by MSA 
   
(0.242) 
 
Proportion of immigrant elders of 
   
2.270*** 
 
the same origin by MSA x HCPH 
   
(0.303) 
 
Gender-based system 
   
 
-0.167 
    
 
(0.142) 
Gender-based system x HCPH 
   
 
0.135 
    
 
(0.158) 
Man 0.043*** 0.037** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
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(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Age 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age2/100 -0.018*** 
-
0.020*** 
-
0.018*** 
-
0.018*** 
-
0.019*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
High school graduate 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.038** 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Some college 0.124*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.122*** 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) 
More college 0.196*** 0.193*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.196*** 
 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) 
Children under sixteen 0.080*** 0.059*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.065*** 
 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Single or never married -0.167*** 
-
0.081*** 
-
0.151*** 
-
0.155*** 
-
0.079*** 
 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) 
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country of origin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value (F-test of HCPH + Gender-based 
    
0.000 
system x HCPH=0) 
     
Observations 8,313 8,313 8,313 8,313 7,9730 
R2 0.285 0.294 0.287 0.286 0.295 
Note: The home-country proportion of homeowners has been defined by marital status. 
Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by country of origin, are in 
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * 
Significant at the 10 percent level 
 
                                                 
1As in Borjas (2002), we restrict our sample to those heads of household aged 18 or older. We do 
not include immigrant over age 69 because the number of observations is very small for that age 
group. 
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2This reference person (householder) is any household member in whose name the property is 
owned or rented, 2016 ACS. We revisit this issue below by extending the analysis to non-
householders. 
3We have eliminated those individuals originating from countries with less than 10 observations per 
country of origin, as in prior studies (Furtado et al., 2013). We use all the observations from 
countries where we have information on the cultural proxy in the IPUMS International. 
4 Due to the non-availability of information in the IPUMS International for the variable measuring 
home-ownership status, we are not able to calculate the cultural proxy (home-ownership rate) for 
China, Cuba, Netherlands, and Ukraine. Then, we cannot include immigrants originating from those 
countries in our sample. 
5 This is a standard strategy, followed in the literature on the cultural effect. As Fernández (2007) 
points out, culture adjusts very slowly, and our findings do not vary after measuring the cultural 
proxy in other years (see below). 
6 As mentioned above, head of household (householder) is any household member in whose name 
the property is owned or rented. This restriction implies losing individuals originating from 
Germany since there is no information on householders for that country in the IPUMS International. 
7Following Furtado et al. (2013), we use a linear probability model for the sake of simplicity. Our 
results are maintained applying a probit model, as can be seen in Table A1 (Appendix). 
8Rodríguez-Planas (2018) uses similar controls. 
9The incorporation of the country of origin fixed effects is not possible in all specifications (see 
below). We have repeated the regressions replacing MSA fixed effects with state fixed effects, and 
we do not find substantial differences. Our findings do not change when including/excluding the 
country of origin fixed effects. 
10 The married group includes those married and unmarried householders with a partner present in 
the household. Married individuals with spouse absent (194 observations) have been included in the 
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
                                                                                                                                       
separated and divorced group. Unmarried couples have been included here because there are some 
countries in which both categories are not separated in the IPUMS International. Thus, we follow 
Marcén and Morales (2018) who consider both categories together. Results do not change when 
excluding unmarried couples and/or those countries that do not distinguish between married and 
unmarried couples. 
11 The change in the sample size when the home-country cultural proxy is calculated by marital 
status, age group, and employment status is due to the non-availability of information for all 
categories. 
12In the IPUMS USA, a metropolitan area is a region formed by neighboring communities that have 
a high degree of economic and social integration with the urban core. The population threshold to 
be classified as an MSA is 100,000 inhabitants. 
13It is also possible to suggest the existence of possible endogeneity problems with some of the 
controls included in the analysis. Results do not vary when we exclude these controls. We have 
incorporated all these controls in the paper, as do other works examining the home-ownership 
decision. 
14Note that, using the cultural proxy by marital status we do not lose observations, as in the case of 
the cultural proxy measured by employment status. 
15See a similar strategy in Furtado et al. (2013) and Marcén et al. (2018). 
16We have chosen country-of-origin Censuses as close as possible to the year 1970 (see Table A2 in 
the Appendix). 
17The variation in the sample size is due to the availability of information for the 1970s. 
18 The omitted decade is the 1940s. 
19 The relationship between culture and home-ownership can be more complex than that between 
culture and, for example, fertility, where the fertility culture has been detected even in teenagers 
(Bellido et al. 2016). 
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20GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by mid-year population. Unemployment rate is 
the percentage of the total labor force that is without work but available for and seeking 
employment. The female labor-force participation rate shows the extent to which women are active 
in the labor force. Labor force comprises individuals aged 15 and older who supply labor for the 
production of goods and services during a specified period. The property prices index is the basic 
measure for apartment purchase affordability (lower is better). It is generally calculated as the ratio 
of median apartment prices to median family disposable income, expressed as years of income. The 
property rights index varies between 0 and 100, and measures the degree to which a country’s laws 
protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also 
assesses the likelihood that private property will be expropriated and analyzes the independence of 
the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and 
businesses to enforce contracts. The more effective the legal protection of property, the higher a 
country’s score will be. Similarly, the greater the chances of government expropriation of property, 
the lower a country’s score will be. This index is also used in Rodríguez-Planas (2018). Data are 
collected for the year 2016 (or for the closest year if no data is available for that year) and come 
from the World Bank Data (GDP pc, unemployment rate, and female labor force participation), 
from the Numbeo database (the property prices index), and from the Index of Economic Freedom 
(the property rights index). 
21We do not have information on all these controls for the entire sample of countries of origin, so 
we lose around four thousand observations. 
22We cannot include the country of origin fixed effects and the MSA fixed effects because with 
many controls the multinomial models do not converge. 
23US native partners have been included in this analysis. We have re-estimated our regressions 
without those individuals and results are the same. 
24In Table 6, head of household is denoted by “HH”. 
25The cultural proxy is defined as the proportion of married and unmarried couples owning a home 
in each country of origin. 
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26The variation in sample size is due to the availability of information for the gender-based system 
in the World Atlas of Language Structures Online. 
